Jyoti Basu in 108: Different Views on the Left Front Government of West Bengal (1977-2000)
On the occasion of Com.
Jyoti Basu’s 108th birth anniversary, let us observe the
different views regarding his tenure as Chief Minister of West Bengal from 1977
to 2000. The excerpts given below express the views of CPI(M),
CPI(ML)Liberation, Prabhat Patnaik (Frontline) and Thomas Crawley (Jacobin).
The various statistics shown should be considered within the tenure of 1977 to
2011.
A. Excerpts from “Thirty Years of the Left Front Government in
West Bengal” - CPI(M); 2007:
Original article: https://www.cpim.org/content/thirty-years-left-front-government-west-bengal
‘…While
assuming office in 1977, the Left Front government was aware of the limitations
of a State government in implementing pro-people policies within the existing
Constitutional set-up. While the major responsibility of delivering services to
the people was with the State Governments, financial resources were
concentrated in the hands of the Centre. Keeping in mind this constraint, the
Left Front government embarked upon a programme to provide immediate relief to
the people and implementing alternative policies in spheres where the State
government had some say. The major initiatives of the first Left Front
government were to carry out thoroughgoing land reforms and establishing a
vibrant Panchayati Raj. These historic initiatives broke the back of landlordism
in the rural areas, empowered the poor peasantry and agricultural workers
immensely and decisively changed the correlation of class forces in favour of
the rural poor. Large sections of the rural poor, especially the dalits,
adivasis and minorities, gravitated towards the Left and the CPI (M). This
section continues to be the most stable mass base of the CPI (M) and the Left
Front till date. Several other pro-people initiatives were also undertaken
regarding workers’ rights and social sector development, which benefited
different sections of the people: factory workers, unorganised workers,
government employees, school and college teachers, students, youth, women and
the refugees. Through their experience, the majority of the people of West
Bengal came to recognise the Left Front government as a pro-people government,
a custodian of their rights and a fighter for their cause. Therefore, since
1977, neither did the people ever look back nor did the Left Front government.’
‘…The land
reforms initiated in West Bengal had three major components: (i) effective
imposition of land ceiling and vesting of ceiling surplus land (ii)
redistribution of vested land among the landless cultivators and (iii) securing
of tenancy rights of sharecroppers (bargadars) through a system of universal
registration of tenant cultivators (Operation Barga). As a result of this
thoroughgoing land reform programme, West Bengal today has the most egalitarian
land ownership pattern in the entire country. While West Bengal accounts for only
around 3% of agricultural land in India, it accounted for over 21% of ceiling
surplus land that has been redistributed in India till date. The total number
of beneficiaries of land redistribution in West Bengal is over 28 lakhs, which
is almost 50% of all beneficiaries of land redistribution in post-independence
India. The security of tenancy rights provided to the sharecroppers under
Operation Barga was also unprecedented in India. The total number of recorded
sharecroppers had reached over 15 lakhs, which accounted for over 20% of the
total agricultural households in the State. Over 11 lakh acres of land was
permanently brought under the control of sharecroppers and their right to
cultivate land was firmly established.’
‘…Following
the onset of the neoliberal policies in the decade of 1990s, whatever land
reform measures were undertaken in most Indian States in the post-independence
period were sought to be reversed. However, in West Bengal an additional 95,000
acres of land was acquired in the 1990s under the land reform legislation and
94,000 acres redistributed. These figures for the decade of the 1990s account
for almost all the land acquired and over 40 per cent of the land redistributed
in the entire country.’
‘…Reorganisation of the
system of local government was one of the most important of the institutional
changes brought about by the Left Front government. In the process, West Bengal
has created a history of participation of the common people through the process
of decentralisation, which is unique in India. A system of democratic elections
to local bodies at anchal, block and district level was instituted: gram panchayats at the anchal
level, panchayat samitis at the block level and zilla parishads at the district
level. Elections to these local bodies were held in June 1978. The
newly elected panchayats were involved with the execution of land reforms.
Panchayats took the initiative in exposing benami land holdings, ensured the
identification of excess land and the declaration of vested land and were also
given charge of ensuring the legal rights of recipients of vested land and
bargadars over land. The panchayats were also involved in arrangements for the
provision of institutional credit for the beneficiaries of vested land and for
bargadars. After the rural development projects were devolved to
panchayats for implementation, the beneficiaries of land reform were given
priority in the receipt of benefits from these projects. This was possible
because through the panchayat election of 1978, a new leadership was
established at the helm of the rural bodies from less privileged socio-economic
backgrounds. The erstwhile village elite, including landlords and moneylenders,
lost their dominance over the newly elected local bodies. The new leadership after
1978 came out of the tradition of peasant upsurge and struggle for land reform
of the past three decades.’
‘…West
Bengal was the first state in the country to make a serious effort at devolving
funds from the state government level to the lower tiers of administration.’
‘…The
proportions of dalit and adivasi panchayat representatives in all the three
tiers were over 37% and 7% respectively, well over their share in
population. Since 1995, one third of
the seats and positions of chairpersons in the panchayati raj institutions have
been reserved for women.’
‘…In the
late 1990s, the Panchayat Raj system in West Bengal was further strengthened by
introducing gram sansads. These are the general councils of voters in
every ward, that are required to meet twice a year with a minimum quorum of 10
per cent of voters to discuss the work done by the panchayats and utilisation
of funds.’
‘…This
“walking on two legs” strategy of the Left Front government; implementing land
reforms and the establishment of an effective panchayati raj in West Bengal;
has not only led to the political empowerment of the rural poor but has also
brought about a rejuvenation of agriculture in the State. Since the Left Front
came into office in 1977, foodgrains production in West Bengal has grown at the
rate of 6 per cent per annum, which is the highest among seventeen most
populous States of India.’
‘…In the
backdrop of the neoliberal policies being adopted by the Centre since early
1990s, agricultural growth has slowed down across the country. While
agriculture grew at less than 2% in India during the Tenth Plan period
(2002-2007), the growth rate of agriculture in West Bengal has been over 3.5%.’
‘…For most parts of its
lengthy tenure, the Left Front government has had to encounter hostile governments
at the Centre. There was a conscious effort on the part of successive Central
governments, particularly those run by the Congress, to discourage
industrialization in West Bengal since it was a Left ruled State. This was done
both through a denial of public sector investment as well as licenses for
setting up private industries. During Indira Gandhi’s tenure as the Prime
minister in the early 1980s, a proposal for setting up an electronics complex
in Salt Lake near Kolkata was shot down by the Central government on security
grounds, because West Bengal was a border State! Permission for the Haldia
Petrochemical project was withheld by the Central government for 11 long years.
Moreover, the freight equalization policy for coal and iron ore robbed West
Bengal, along with the other states in the Eastern region of India, of its
locational advantage of being the most mineral rich region of the country.
Following these discriminatory policies pursued by the Centre and the vitriolic
anti-Communist propaganda carried out by the bourgeois media, which led to some
degree of capital flight, West Bengal experienced industrial stagnation during
the decade of the 1980s. Traditional industries like tea, jute and engineering
were on a decline. This aggravated the unemployment situation in the State,
especially in the urban areas, besides causing hardships for the workers in the
sick industries. The need was felt to make special efforts to reverse the trend
towards industrial stagnation and re-industrialize West Bengal.
Meanwhile, a big policy
shift had come at the national level when the Narasimha Rao led Congress
Government adopted the “New Economic Policies” in 1991 following the dictates
of the IMF and the World Bank. The neoliberal “economic reforms” initiated by the
Central government abandoned the earlier emphasis on public sector investment,
devised a strategy of liberalizing and deregulating the economy and laid
emphasis on private capital, both domestic and foreign, as the main driver of
economic growth. On the one hand these policy changes were clearly in the
rightwing direction, which was opposed by the CPI (M) and the Left. On the
other hand, it also meant an end to the discriminatory policy regime of the
Central government, based upon licensing and freight equalization policy, which
had caused enormous harm to the economic interests of West Bengal. It was in
this backdrop that the he Left Front government had to devise its
industrialization strategy. In September 1994, Comrade Jyoti Basu announced the
Industrial Policy of the Left Front government in the changed scenario, which
stated: “we are all for new technology and investment in selective spheres
where they help our economy and which are of mutual interest. The goal of
self-reliance, however, is as needed today as earlier. We have the state
sector, the private sector and also the joint sector. All these have a role to
play”. Following the adoption of the Industrial Policy, the industrial scenario
in the state witnessed a turnaround, with important projects like Haldia
Petrochemicals and Bakreshwar Thermal Power plants finally being set up.’
‘…The number of schools in West Bengal has seen a substantial increase in
the post-1977 period, with the number of secondary and higher secondary schools
registering a four fold increase, from 4600 in 1977 to over 22,500 in 2006.
Accordingly, the number of students appearing for the secondary board
examination has increased from a little over 2 lakhs in 1977 to over 7.5 lakhs
in 2006.’
‘…The West
Bengal Minority Development Finance Corporation, which was formed in 1996,
provides training as well as soft loans for self-employment and scholarships
for meritorious students among Muslims. The reforms brought about in Madarsa
education in West Bengal are also noteworthy, especially the modernisation of
curriculum including introduction of vocational courses and computer training
and bringing the recruitment of teachers in madrasas under the purview of the
School Service Commission. It is significant that 65% of students studying in
the madarsas of West Bengal are girl students and 12% of students are
non-Muslims.’
‘…the Left
Front government was the first State government to announce a sub-plan for
minorities at the state level to implement the recommendations of the Sachar
Committee.’
B. Excerpts from “The
Many Faces of the Indian Left” - Thomas Crawley; Jacobin, 2014:
Original article: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/05/the-many-faces-of-the-indian-left
‘…In West Bengal, where the party has long
been dominated by the Hindu bhadralok (or the well-educated,
culturally refined, upper caste “gentlemen” of the state), the decline of the
CPI(M) has been more precipitous. The party was in power from 1977 to 2011, a
period of uninterrupted rule that spawned an entrenched patronage network that
guaranteed the party’s winning electoral formula at the expense of more
thoroughgoing change.’
‘…As threats to its hegemony gained forced,
the West Bengal government increasingly resorted to violence, intimidation, and
repression. This coincided with the government’s embrace of neoliberal policies
in the 1990s. The fact that it was a “Communist” party did not stop it from
pursuing a policy of rapid liberalization (an irony not unknown in nearby
China). The CPI(M) embraced public-private partnerships, attracted foreign
investment by trumpeting its low-wage workforce…’
C. Excerpts from “Left in government” - Prabhat
Patnaik; Frontline, 2006:
Original article: https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/article30209599.ece
‘…The remarkable turnaround in this situation
which the Left Front achieved within a few years of assuming office in 1977
would appear unbelievable to anyone who had witnessed the earlier situation.
Indeed the dynamics of that turnaround are still not very clear and require a
substantial theoretical endeavour. There is only one thing, however, that can
be said about it with certainty, namely, that at the core of it was the
overcoming of the agrarian crisis.
Lord Cornwallis' Permanent Settlement had left
two important legacies in Bengal's economy. First, since the revenue accruing
to the colonial government was fixed, the rate of return to the government from
any investment in irrigation was nil, or at any rate way below the minimum rate
of return which the colonial government insisted on earning on all its
investments. Hence Bengal saw very little irrigation investment in the colonial
period. There was an additional reason for this: following the report of the
Royal Commission on Agriculture (1926) a view had gained currency that the
problem of Bengal agriculture arose from too much, rather than too little,
water. This neglect of irrigation from the colonial period, though slightly
reversed after Independence, continued to haunt West Bengal's agriculture.
Secondly, as is well known, the Permanent
Settlement had spawned a large parasitic class of rent receivers living off a
pauperised peasantry. At the very top were the zamindars; but between them and
the cultivators were several layers of parasites, up to 27 in some places,
which obviously discouraged any productive investment on land.
Post-Independence land reforms had removed the top layer of zamindars but
already by the time of Independence, as the Bengal Provincial Kisan Sabha had
pointed out in its memorandum to the Floud Commission, a new and powerful class
of intermediaries, the jotedars, had emerged, so that zamindari abolition, far
from freeing the peasantry from the stranglehold of these parasites, had the
paradoxical effect of strengthening the latter. The disincentives to productive
investment on land therefore continued, as did the abysmal state of the
cultivators.
The Left Front confronted both these
constraints head on. Land reform measures, initiated by the short-lived United
Front governments earlier, were carried forward, through the recording of
sharecroppers under Operation Barga, through the conferring on them of rights
to land, and through the distribution of ceiling-surplus land. This was
followed by the setting up of an alternative institutional mechanism in the
countryside, the panchayats, which not only entailed decentralisation of power
and decision-making, but also provided an alternative to the traditional
power-structure dominated by the jotedars. The balance of class forces was
altered in the countryside in favour of the oppressed peasantry and against the
jotedars, which, apart from strengthening democracy, also encouraged productive
investment by the peasantry, and hence the development of the productive
forces. At the same time there was a substantial step-up in public expenditure
on rural development in general and on irrigation in particular. A sea change
occurred in the cropping intensity and in the cropping pattern. Areas which for
centuries had witnessed single cropping now started growing three crops. Local
level plans began to be drawn up with the help of the democratically-elected
representatives of the people serving on the panchayats.
Agricultural growth in West Bengal began to
pick up. To some extent, even before the Left Front came to power, the
potentials of, and the scope for, multiple cropping had become evident in small
pockets in districts like Bardhaman and Birbhum, where potato and boro rice had
been cultivated as a third crop, in addition to the aman and the aus. But what
had remained confined to small pockets now became the common practice over
large tracts of the State, so much so that in the decade of the 1980s West
Bengal witnessed the highest rate of growth in agricultural production among
all the States in the country. In the 1990s, the growth rate came down
everywhere, a result inter alia of the neoliberal policies adopted by the
Centre which squeezed the peasantry even as they forced a curtailment of public
investment in rural development. Even so, among the States, West Bengal
continues to be a high performer.
Rapid agricultural growth, together with
increased government expenditure in the countryside, enlarged the rural market
in the State, both for food grains and for a variety of simple industrial
goods. It is interesting that among all the States in India, West Bengal and
Kerala were the only two that witnessed a steady increase in the per capita
cereal consumption by the rural population in the 1980s and the 1990s (It is
not yet clear if, in the first five years of this century, as the effects of
the neoliberal policies of the Central government have begun to make themselves
felt, and the public distribution system has begun to be whittled down, these
two States have succeeded in sustaining their remarkable record).
The increased demand for simple industrial
goods in the countryside brought about a remarkable "industrialisation
from below" in West Bengal, with substantial employment effects, whose
reach and significance have been inadequately appreciated till now. And with
rising incomes, the State government's revenues also rose, making possible
enhanced social sector expenditures, and a general improvement in the quality
of life of the people, at least until the Centre's neoliberal policies started
hurting the State.’
‘…As the tax-gross domestic product ratio of the
Centre declined over the 1990s (the States did much better in this regard), the
Centre not only cut back its own expenditure, especially rural development
expenditure, but passed on the burden of its fiscal crisis to the shoulders of
the State governments, through reduced transfers to the States and exorbitant
interest rates (even exceeding the rate of growth of Net State Domestic
Products) on its loans to the States. The States thus became the victims of
this fiscal squeeze, and West Bengal was no exception. The Centre used this
fiscal squeeze in turn to force the States to fall in line behind its pursuit
of a neoliberal agenda.’
D. Excerpts from “Twenty-Five Years Of Left
Front Government In West Bengal: Solemn Promises and Sordid Performance” -
CPI(ML)Liberation; 2002:
Original article: http://www.archive.cpiml.org/liberation/year_2002/june/specialfeature.htm
‘TWENTY-FIVE years back, in 1977, the Left
Front led by Mr. Jyoti Basu of CPI(M) came to power in West Bengal. The Front
defeated the Emergency-tainted Congress Party, which had been unleashing a
‘semi-fascist’ terror, particularly against the revolutionary left, the
Naxalites, although in this course, even the leftist ranks of the parties of
the Left Front were not spared. Democracy became the crying need of the people;
the mood and temper of the people of West Bengal was such that to defeat the
Congress they would vote for any party or alliance that promised minimum
democracy to the people. The Left Front promised to give them a better life and
a better economy apart from democracy – in a nut-shell, ‘better governance’. In
the Front’s parlance it would be ‘alternative rule’ by a combination of left
parties. What has happened to that promise today? The promises and proposals
made in the 1977 charter (they were 36 in all, with a number of sections and
sub-sections appended to each) have all vanished into thin air…’
1. To nationalize all the core industries. To abolish the
power of monopoly capital. To take effective steps to stop infiltration of the
multinational corporations. (Point No. 1) |
1. One such big industry, termed as the ‘pride of Bengal’ is
Haldia Petrochem, which was built in joint collaboration with Purnendu
Chatterjee of Soros Group and the Tatas. Now the West Bengal government has
sold its shares to Mr. Chatterjee, retaining no stakes in Haldia Petrochem. The
Tatas have also withdrawn their shares. Haldia Petrochem has now become the
‘native pride of the foreign capital’. The other big industry is Bakreswar
Thermal Power Project. It was built on B.O.T. basis. The Japanese Mitsubishi,
the Microsoft, the IBM, all are welcome here, because “we want capital”. “We
are a capital-friendly government” – now this is the mantra of the ‘improved
Left Front’. The process started after their much celebrated ‘Industrial Policy
of 1994’ took shape during Mr. Jyoti Basu’s tenure. The ITC, Videocon,
Hindustan Lever, Lafarge, are all being accorded red carpet welcome. This is
the ‘alternative’ of abolition of monopoly or checking multinationals. |
2. To provide jobs for all the able-bodied hands, and social
security and unemployment allowance to the unemployed youth. (Point No. 3) |
2. The number of unemployed youth has shot up to a registered
66 lakh figure. If the unregistered unemployed youth are also to be counted,
the number would cross the ten million mark. When the Left Front government
came to power in ’77, the number of registered unemployed youth was not more
than 10-11 lakh. Yes, of course, the government has started an unemployment
allowance in ’79, but the amount is a meagre Rs. 50 per month. Now the
government has decided to offer the unemployed a one-time sum of Rs. 5000. You
take this allowance and your employment exchange card will be seized. Nor would
you be allowed to sit for public service commission examinations. To those
having no employment whatsoever, what kind of social security would the
government offer? Would they get free medical service, free education, free
food and free travel? If not, what comes under this social security? This year,
the ‘improved Left Front’ government has introduced an examination fee for
clerical exams. The unemployed youth have to pay Rs. 250 to Rs. 500 for these
exams. |
3. To fix the remunerative/support prices of cash crops like
jute and cotton so as to protect the interests of the primary producers, and to
purchase these produces on support price (if possible, with a bonus to the small
producers) to check distress sale or black-marketing. (Point No. 4) |
3. Distress sale of jute is a common phenomenon in North
Bengal, and also in North and South Dinajpur and Nadia districts. Last year the
Jute Corporation of India stopped purchase of jute due to paucity of funds. The
state government has no institutions to purchase jute. The only course they
have is to blame the central government for the crisis of the jute-growers.
This year the producers are selling Aman and Aous (local seasonal varieties)
paddy at much below the government-declared support prices, i.e., Rs. 530 to
Rs. 550 per quintal. The sale is going on at Rs. 320 to Rs. 340 per quintal.
Bonus to small producers of paddy is ‘not possible’ due to ‘resource crunch’.
West Bengal has not yet gone the Andhra Pradesh way, but if you pursue
Chandrababu’s path, how long can the incidence of suicides be kept at bay? |
4. To solve the bustee (settlers’ colony) problem and arrange
for sufficient aid from the Center to provide shelter to all, particularly to
the weaker sections. (Point No. 7) |
4. Around 20,000 people, most of them coming from erstwhile
East Pakistan in the late 1960s, have been bulldozed for the ‘developmental
purpose’. Altogether 10 lakh people in Kolkata and its suburbs are under the
threat of eviction. They are now becoming ‘developmental refugees’. Not only in
Kolkata, even in Siliguri the weaker sections residing at the bank of river
Teesta have received ‘eviction orders’. No alternative shelters are being
promised. Be it Narmada project or the Metro Rail Project in Kolkata, the new
dictum of development schemes is: the poor have to make sacrifices for city’s
development. |
5. To
immediately open all the closed industries, lift lock-outs and lay-offs in all
cases, stop retrenchments and reinstate all the penalized workers and
employees. (Point No. 10) To ensure need-based minimum wages,
pension and other social security schemes for all… (Point No. 12)
To provide job-security and abolish the
contract system. (Point No. 14) |
5. The
number of closed and sick industries in West Bengal has reached 66,000. The ratio of lockout to strikes in
1998-99 was 2:1. Thus West Bengal has become a ‘peaceful’ state for capital
investment and also for capital flight! The Dunlop owned by Manu Chhabria is a
case in point. The blue-eyed Brailly of UK siphoned off Rs. 100 crore from 4
jute mills in West Bengal. West Bengal’s industrialists top the
list of PF/ESI/Gratuity defaulters. According to an approximate estimate, PF
defaults amount to Rs. 120 crore, ESI defaults Rs. 80 crore and Gratuity to Rs.
50 crore. No, the private sector industries are
not the only culprits. The state government is no less responsible with PF/ESI
dues in state PSUs amounting to over Rs. 10 crore. Following the footsteps of the central government, the LF government of the state has left 1,00,000 posts vacant. It is even planning for e-governance with a declared aim to introduce a better ‘work culture’ among the government employees. This step is being opposed even by the coordination committee led by CPI(M). |
6. To
acquire ceiling-surplus and benami land and distribute the same free of cost to
the landless, poor peasants and agrarian labourers. To radically change the
land reform legislations so as to do away with all modes of re-centralisation
of land ownership and provide adequate benefits to the bargadars, landless
peasants and agrarian labourers. (Point No. 16)
To arrange for round-the-year work for
agrarian labourers and payment of adequate livelihood wages to them. (Point No.
20) |
6. Out
of the 10 lakh acres of land acquired for distribution, only 2.5 lakh acres of
land has actually been distributed during the entire 25-year period. Most of
the ceiling surplus land was captured by the peasants themselves during the
turbulent days of Naxalbari movement in the late 1960s and early ’70s. Cases related to 2,50,000 acres of
so-called disputed surplus land are still pending in the court. Obviously, the
erstwhile landholders are benefited by these ‘disputes’. Out of 30 lakh bargadars, only 15 lakh
got registered in the early days of Operation Barga. Now the operation has been
wound up. Rather the reverse process has gained momentum. Poor bargadars with
no means to sustain their livelihood settle with the landowners for a paltry
sum of money and become landless agrarian labourers. In Bardhaman district
alone at least 70,000 such cases have been noticed by the district land revenue
department. Such incidence is also noticed in North Dinajpur, Maldah, and
Midnapore districts. Following the 2nd and 3rd land reform
acts and their amendments, at least 19 lakh acres of land has become ceiling
surplus. But the poor landless agrarian labourers are not getting even a few
bighas of land. The minimum wage fixed by the state government
for the agrarian labourers is Rs. 62.10, with some regional variations. But to
get it in reality remains a dream for agrarian labourers everywhere. Generally
they get Rs. 28 to Rs. 35 plus 2 kg. of rice, and in some places the wages are
as low as Rs. 20 to Rs. 25 only. Most of the agrarian labourers (their total
number being more than 70 lakh) are getting jobs for only 100 to 130 days a
year. The ‘food for work’ programme, under which 100 days work is to be provided by the panchayats, is very much absent in many areas. Wherever the scheme is being implemented, it is marred by partisan sectarianism, nepotism and corruption. From the Karanda killings in Bardhaman in 1993 to the recent episode in Suchapur in Birbhum, or Chhota Angaraia killings in Midnapore, show that contradictions are maturing in rural Bengal between the neo-rich and the agrarian labourers. The CPI(M) machinery is throttling the assertion of the agrarian labourers to get organized as a class for itself. The recent incident of burning of houses and properties by CPI(M) goons in Dhanekhali block in Hooghly district is a pointer to this. |
7. To
institute a proper enquiry into the killings of citizens and political
activists including Hemanta Basu (a Forward Block leader) during and before
emergency and to punish the culprits. (Point No. 31) The Left Front proposes to set up an
enquiry commission regarding the incidents of police torture on political
leaders and cadres in the police stations, jails and other places and the
killings of political prisoners inside the jails. The ministers, officers and
others responsible for all these dastardly acts would be invariably punished in
an exemplary way. (Point No. 32 A) The Left Front proposes to set up another commission to search out persons (ministers and corrupt officials included) responsible for the autocratic measures, corruption and crimes against people and ensure that they are duly punished. |
7. The
less said is better in this regard. The large-scale genocide perpetrated
against revolutionary communists and the ranks of left parties (even CPI(M)
lost 1,200 cadres in the genocide) in the 1970s has still not been investigated
and none of the perpetrators of these crimes has been punished. The two enquiry
commissions set up to investigate them were dismantled midway.
Thereafter, not only the Naxalites but
all the progressive forces in West Bengal have appealed to the government and
our Party has even organized a successful statewide bandh to press the demand
for setting up such a commission. But all this has fallen into the deaf ears of
the government.’ |
E. Excerpts
from “The Great Bengal Verdict and After” - CPI(ML)Liberation; 2011:
Original article: https://www.cpiml.net/liberation/2011/06/great-bengal-verdict-and-after
‘Rather than unleashing a fresh wave of class struggle, the
CPI(M) since 1977 relied on state-sponsored relief and reform to broaden its
own social base and the Left Front Government (LFG) from day one emphasised
moderation and class peace.
The most renowned reforms undertaken by this government was the Operation Barga-Panchayati Raj duo. These two together led to the rise of the middle strata – known to be the best vehicle for conciliating antagonistic class interests – to a new prominence in the social hierarchy of rural Bengal, providing the LFG with a broad and stable social base. The next logical step in Operation Barga (OB) would be to transfer ownership to sharecroppers and thereby implement the basic slogan of land reform, “land to the tiller”. But Jyoti Basu and his colleagues deliberately avoided it, apprehending intensification of class contradictions. Abandoned midstream, OB lost momentum and by late 1980s reversal of land reforms started. Meantime, Panchayati Raj had generated its own vested interests and increasingly came to represent an oppressive, dictatorial party power.
The other
face of LFG was unveiled, barely two years after its inception, in
Morichjhanpi, an island in the Sunderbans. A cruel evacuation drive was
launched against Bangladeshi refugees who were trying to settle there and the
scale of repression was incomparably larger than what was to be witnessed later
in Nandigram. The morning really showed the day: there would be scores of cases
of police brutalities on agitating workers (for example, six striking dock
workers in Kolkata were killed in police firing in a single incident in 1979
itself), peasants and others throughout the whole tenure of the LFG. Basu’s
message was stern and straightforward: any serious opposition to “the people’s
government” would be crushed immediately and ruthlessly.
An Indian model of social democratic rule was
thus built up over the years, one that based itself on class collaboration
rather than class struggle and preferred stability of government power over
turbulence of mass movements. In addition to the reform package, the LFG’s
rural base was also bolstered by a coincidence which it efficiently utilised:
the spread of the so-called green revolution to the rice growing areas of
Eastern India. The resultant enhanced productivity (whatever the long-term
negative consequences) benefited rich and middle peasants substantially and
there were some trickle-down benefits for the poor, too. The broad support base
thus developed and a well-knit, efficient party organisation provided the twin
pillars for the fabled stability and ‘invincibility’ of the Left Front
government.
But how come the ruling classes did not
attempt to destabilise and oust this government the way it did in Kerala in the
late 1950s and in West Bengal in 1967 and 1970? In fact such an apprehension
was haunting the CPI(M) in the initial years, particularly after the return of
Indira Gandhi to power in 1980. Gradually, however, it transpired that the
ruling elite were not finding it necessary to tread the beaten track. There
were at least two major reasons behind this.
For one, the counterrevolutionary credentials
of the CPI(M) in office had already been established by the way the UF
government unleashed the armed forces of the state to smash the so-called
Naxalite movement in the late 1960s. Largely on this basis there developed a
Jyoti-Siddhartha-Indira axis, thanks to which CPI(M) leaders (with the
exception of Jyotirmay Basu) remained at large during the emergency period even
as many prominent leaders of the bourgeois opposition found themselves behind
bars. Of course, there was a quid pro quo: the CPI(M) did not build any
struggle worth mentioning in opposition to the emergency and by the party’s own
subsequent admission remained largely immobilised. Thus at the highest level
the party had earned the political trust of the Congress, and of the ruling
classes for that matter, well before 1977.
Secondly, unlike the UF governments of late
1960s, the LFG was not a product of class struggle and did not operate in an
atmosphere of mass militancy. The CPI(M), as noted above, was now a thoroughly
and visibly mellowed lot with no streak even of its militant economism of
yesteryears.
In such conditions Ms Gandhi, made wiser by
the harrowing experience of the mid-1970s, started her second innings with a
new and improved strategy: allow the country’s largest left party (and its
allies) to operate within the confines of constitutionalism but keep it under
constant pressure and work for its complete assimilation in the bourgeois state
system. But for this intelligent policy shift – pursued and perfected by all
subsequent governments at the centre – the “world record” of the longest
serving “communist government” in a bourgeois set-up would not have been
possible.’
‘…To be sure, the metamorphosis could not have come about in a day
or two. The process started back in late 1980s, when the CPI(M) changed its
self perception from a party leading a “transitory government” (committed to a
modest programme of relief to the working people and functioning as a weapon of
struggle) to a stable and “responsible” one (obliged to compete with and excel
over other state governments in the matter of industrialisation and growth) and
began to introduce a whole series of policy changes. The original emphasis on
the state sector and cottage and small industries was replaced by a policy of
industrialisation in the joint (public-private) sector in the 12th Congress of
CPI(M) (1985); the state government adopted a brand-new industrial policy in
1994 mirroring the policy of economic restructuring introduced by the central
government in 1991…’
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